Most Favored Nation Clause Collective Bargaining Agreement

Local 100 argues, however, that the nature of the agreement it obtained from Connell is expressly authorized by the construction industry on 8 conditions E and that antitrust policy must therefore be referred to the NRL. The majority of the Court of Appeal refused to rule on this issue because it was within the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the NLRB. 483 F.2d, to 1174. However, the Tribunal held that federal courts could rule on labour law issues that arise as ancillary issues in appeals under independent federal jurisdiction, including cartel laws. 3 We conclude that 8th) does not allow this type of agreement. [ Footnote 13 ] As noted above, the establishment of the apparel industry at 628-630 reflects different considerations. The wording of the reservation and the handling of debates and congressional reports suggest that Congress intended to allow garment workers` unions to continue using subcontracts as an organizational weapon. See Danielson/Joint Board, 494 F.2d 1230 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J.). In addition, there is much evidence in the legislative proceedings that Congress made in 1959 the same deliberate decision to exclude corrective actions taken by Congress in 1947 for violation of 8th) by extending the scope of 303 to a fight against secondary pressures to compel an employer to sign an illegal “hot cargo” clause and remedies for violation of 8 e). As part of its efforts to organize mechanical contractors in the Dallas area, defendant Local Union No. 100 [421 U.S. 616, 639] engaged in a peaceful picketing to induce the petitioner Connell Construction Co., a general contractor in the construction industry, to assign sanitary and mechanical work on the site only to companies that had signed a collective agreement with 100 Locals.

None of Connell`s employees were members of Local 100, and the subcontract contained an explicit refusal to organize or represent it. The pickup at Connell`s site was therefore an incidental activity, subject to detailed and comprehensive regulation in accordance with point 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as added, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C 158 (b) (4) and 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 158, as amended, 29 U.S.C 187. Similarly, the subcontracting agreement under which Connell agreed to cease operations with non-union mechanical contractors is governed by provisions of 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C 158 (e). The legislative history in this area clearly shows that, in the context of the regulation of secondary activities and hot freight agreements in 1947 and 1959, Congress carefully chose the sanctions to be applied in the event of prohibited trade union activity. In doing so, Congress rejected efforts to give private parties, aggrieved by union activities such as Local 100, the right to apply for discharge under federal cartel laws. That is why I would like to confirm the judgment before us.

In this case, Local used 100 direct restrictions on the commercial market to support its organizing campaign. Agreements with Connell and other general contractors indiscriminately excluded independent subcontractors from unions in a portion of the market, even though their competitive advantages are not due to below-average wages and working conditions, but to more efficient working methods. Limiting competition based on efficiency is neither an objective of federal labour policy nor a necessary effect of the elimination of competition between workers. In addition, efficiency-based competition is a positive value that antitrust legislation seeks to protect.